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HELPING JURORS DETERMINE PAIN AND
SUFFERING AWARDS
Oscar G. Chase*

I. INTRODUCTION

The process by which pain and suffering damages are awarded in
the United States has been aptly called "procedurally simple but analytically impenetrable."' As the same author goes on to say, "[tihe
law provides no guidance, in terms of any benchmark, standard figure, or method of analysis, to aid the jury in the process of determining an appropriate award."2 This state of affairs has prompted the
attention of several commentators who have criticized the existing
regime and suggested a variety of thoughtful proposals to improve the
situation.3 In addition to describing the problem and some of the sug* Professor of Law and Vice Dean, New York University School of Law. I appreciate
the valuable research assistance of Gail Balcerzak, John F. Brown, Arlo M. Chase, Kevin L.
Mintzer, and Shari L. Rosenblum. I thank the Institute of Judicial Administration and Aetna
Life and Casualty for providing financial assistance for this article. A prior version of this
Article was presented at the Institute of Judicial Administration's Research Conference on
Civil Justice in the 1990s, at New York University School of Law, October, 1993. Helpful
comments have been provided by Samuel Estreicher, Mark Geistfeld, James B. Jacobs, Lewis
Komhauser, David W. Leebron, Russel F. Moran, Burt Neubome, Linda Silberman, and Peter
Tillers. All the views expressed in this paper are my own, and I am responsible for any
errors it contains.
1. David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to
Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256, 265 (1989).
2. Id.
3. A partial listing includes AmERICAN BAR ASSOC., REPORT OF THE AcrION CoM-
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gested solutions in the literature, I will present a new proposal.

Apart from those who would dispense with non-pecuniary damages entirely, all of the suggestions of which I am aware (including
my own) seek to enhance analytic coherence, but do so at the price
of procedural simplicity and most would restrict the scope of the
jury's authority. If reform is to be made at all, the question "how?"

must be answered by setting procedural loss against analytic gain.
The proposal offered here preserves the power of the jury, enhances
the jurors' ability to make an informed decision, and eschews procedural complexity.

II. THE CURRENT REGvME, rrs DEFECTS AND iTS COSTS
Non-pecuniary damages have been criticized for different flaws
by different observers. Most basic is the claim that they are without
justification and should be abolished.4 Other opponents of pain and
suffering awards would cap them at some maximum dollar level, an
argument that has found favor with some state legislatures.5 These
attacks on the substance of pain and suffering law are not the focus
of this paper. They should remind us that failure to mediate the deficiencies-the analytic impenetrability--of the current regime may be

used by opponents of full tort recoveries as a justification for babyand-bath water solutions.6

MISSION TO IMPROVE THE TORT LIABIITY SYSTEM 10-15 (1987) [hereinafter ABA COMMISSION REPORT]; 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSImmY FOR

PERSONAL INJuRY 199-230 (1991) [hereinafter ALI REPORT]; James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing Damages for Personal Injury, 8
YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1991); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort:
Scheduling "Pain and Suffering", 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908 (1989); Leebron, supra note 1;
Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries-Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts, 1989
WiS. L. REv. 237.

A more extensive list is found in David Baldus et al., Preliminary Report, Comparative AdditurlRemittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms (Pain, Suffering, and Loss
of Enjoyment of Life) and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 825 (forthcoming Oct. 1995).
4. See, e.g., 2 ALI REPORT, supra note 3, at 204-17, 229 (reviewing the arguments for
and against pain and suffering damages, and, while finding the case for them "uneasy", recommending that they be retained).
5. For a discussion of the $250,000 cap adopted in California and the indexed cap in
the State of Washington, see id. at 218. The ALI Reporters questioned the use of caps because: (i) unless indexed, they inexorably force a decline in tort recoveries when measured in
constant dollars; (ii) they arbitrarily prevent full pain and suffering recoveries by the most
severely injured persons while allowing full recovery to others; and (iii) they do not eliminate
the large variations in pain and suffering awards that have been the source of much of the
criticism of them. Id.
6. The ALI Report provides:
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A less fundamental but still trenchant criticism goes to the
standardless nature of the jury's task. Reviewing courts7 are free (as
jurors are not) to use information about prior awards in similar cases,
but they too are hampered by lack of information and lack of commonly accepted principle.
An inescapable reality of the pain and suffering conundrum is
that tort law requires the monetization of a "product" for which there
is no market and therefore no market price. This largely explains the
lamented fact that the jurors who must undertake the monetization are
given no "absolute" standard by which to do it. There is none to give
them. Each juror must create or bring their own standard to the courtroom.8 Proposals for legislatively enacted mandatory schedules do not
solve this problem. Although they might moderate the related problem
of variation among awards, they would merely shift the locus of
power to do the impossible, that is, find the right level of compensation.
Consider the situation of a juror asked to determine the correct
amount of money with which to compensate the plaintiff for the
suffering endured at the hands of the defendant. Our juror will have
heard the plaintiff's testimony about the nature and severity of the
suffering, perhaps observed something of its source (as, for example,
if the plaintiff is paraplegic), heard expert testimony about the severity and likely duration of the pain, perhaps seen a video tape of the
plaintiff's distressful daily regimen, and have been exhorted to be
generous by the plaintiff's lawyer and to be reasonable by the adversary. The typical jury charge on the issue gives no real guidance at

We believe that the cap model has far more vices than virtues, and the fact that
state legislatures have been so ready to impose such caps should give pause to
those who assert that statutory tort reform reflects a fair and balanced appraisal of
the interests of both actors and victims.
Id. at 218.
7. A trial or appellate court may set aside a damage award that is found to be too
high or low. See FLEmNG JAMES, JR. Er AL., CVmL PROCEDUE § 7.29 (4th ed. 1992).
8. Valuation must depend to some extent on the juror's economic circumstances and

tolerance for pain. I had occasion to conduct a thought experiment on valuing pain and suffering while writing this Article. I became ill with a non-threatening but very discomforting
malady. After the third day in what seemed to be endless suffering, I asked myself how

much money I would demand for each additional day of the illness, assuming I could make
such a demand. I concluded that it would take at "least $50,000 per day, but that the amount
would escalate as the days wore on. I then asked myself what I would pay to reduce my
illness by one day. The figure was closer to $1,000. Finally, I should confess, when I was

able to get the prescription drug ordered by my physician, I complained about the price
(about $25). How much was my suffering worth? Even I could not give a coherent answer.
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all. In New York, the Pattern Jury Instructions, although not binding
on courts, are commonly used. They prescribe these instructions:
PHI 2:280. Damages-Personal Injury-Injury and Pain and Suffering
If you decide for plaintiff on the question of liability you must
include in your verdict an award of money for the injury you find
that plaintiff (decedent) suffered and for conscious pain and suffering caused by defendant.
Conscious pain and suffering means pain and suffering of
which there was some level of awareness by plaintiff (decedent).
Plaintiff is entitled to recover a sum of money which will
justly and fairly compensate (him, her) for the injury and for the
conscious pain and suffering to date.9
Another standard source, Jury Instructions on Damages in Tort
Actions, is also interesting because it seeks to provide more specifics:
6-17. Physical pain and suffering-Past and future.
In assessing damages, if you have occasion to do so, the law
allows you to award to plaintiff a sum that will reasonably compensate him/her for any past physical pain, as well as pain that is reasonably certain to be suffered in the future as a result of the
defendant's wrongdoing.
There are no objective guidelines by which you can measure
the money equivalent of this element of injury; the only real measuring stick, if it can be so described, is your collective enlightened
conscience. You should consider all the evidence bearing on the
nature of the injuries, the certainty of future pain, the severity and
the likely duration thereof.
In this difficult task of putting a money figure on an aspect of
injury that does not readily lend itself to an evaluation in terms of
money, you should try to be as objective, calm and dispassionate as
the situation will permit, and not to be unduly swayed by considerations of sympathy.'

9. 1 NEw YORK PATrERN JURY INSTRUCIONS-CIVIL 534 (2d ed. Supp. 1995).
10. RONALD W. EADES, JURY INSTRUCIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS 321 (3d
ed. 1993).
Other jurisdictions use similar language:
1.3
INTRODUCTION TO DAMAGES
(Personal Injury-No Punitive Damages Sought)
In considering the issue of Plaintiff's damages, you are instructed that you
should assess the amount you find to be justified by a preponderance of the evi-

dence as full, just and reasonable compensation for all of the Plaintiff's damages,

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol23/iss4/1

4

Chase: Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards
19951

HELPING JURORS

no more and no less.
You should consider the following elements of damage, to the extent you
find them proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and no others ....
COMM'rIEE ON PATrERN JURY INSTRUCrIONS, DIsTmcr JuIrEs Assoc., ELEVENTH CIRcuIT,
PATERN JURY INsTRUCTIONS: CIvIL CASES 164 (1990).
2.1
PERSONAL INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE CASES
(Bodily Injury, Pain and Suffering, Disability, Disfigurement, Loss of Capacity for
the Enjoyment of Life)
Any bodily injury sustained by the Plaintiff and any resulting pain and
suffering ...
experienced in the past [or to be experienced in the future]. No
evidence of the value of such intangible things as mental or physical pain and
suffering has been or need be introduced. In that respect it is not value you are

trying to determine, but an amount that will fairly compensate the Plaintiff for the
damages he has suffered. There is no exact standard for fixing the compensation to
be awarded on account of such elements of damage. Any such award should be
fair and just in the light of the evidence.
Id at 166 (alteration in original).
15.2
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

If you find that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff, then you must determine an amount that is fair compensation for all of the plaintiff's damages ....
The purpose of compensatory damages is to make the plaintiff whole-that is, to
compensate the plaintiff for the damage that the plaintiff has suffered ....
If you decide to award compensatory damages, you should be guided by
dispassionate common sense. Computing damages may be difficult, but you must
not let that difficulty lead you to engage in arbitrary guesswork. On the other
hand, the law does not require that the plaintiff prove the amount of his losses
with mathematical precision, but only with as much definiteness and accuracy as
the circumstances permit.
You must use sound discretion in fixing an award of damages, drawing
reasonable inferences where you find them appropriate from the facts and circumstances in evidence.
You should consider the following elements of damage, to the extent you
find them proved by a preponderance of the evidence ....
U.S. FIFTH CIRcurT DISmT
168-69 (1994).
15.4

JUDGES Assoc., PATrERN JURY INsTRuCTIONs: CIVIL CAsES

INJURY/PAIN/DISABILITY/DISFIGUREMENT/LOSS OF CAPACITY FOR
ENJOYMENT OF LIFE
You may award damages for any bodily injury that the plaintiff sustained

and any pain and suffering . . . that the plaintiff experienced in the past [or will
experience in the future] as a result of the bodily injury. No evidence of the value
of intangible things, such as mental or physical pain and suffering, has been or

need be introduced. You are not trying to determine value, but an amount that will
fairly compensate the plaintiff for the damages he has suffered. There is no exact
standard for fixing the compensation to be awarded for these elements of damage.
Any award that you make should be fair in the light of the evidence.
Id at 172 (alteration in original).
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In the attempt to give the jury some guidance, the instructions may
introduce still greater confusion. What is a "collective enlightened
conscience"? How much sympathy does it take to be "unduly
swayed"? If there are no "objective guidelines," how should one
proceed? What tools can one use? The open-ended quality of the
jurors' task leads to three sorts of criticism of the process. It introduces unwarranted variations in result and is therefore unpredictable.
It allows the jurors to use inappropriate criteria. It diminishes public
confidence in the legal system because of the apparently arbitrary
nature of the process.
A.

Unacceptable Variations in Jury Awards

Both anecdotal and empirical evidence indicates that the disparity
between awards for pain and suffering among apparently similar cases
defies rational explanation. Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein compiled
a database of 898 cases drawn from jury verdict reports in Florida
and Kansas City. They found that the total compensation award
varies with severity of injury, but that this factor explained only twofifths of the magnitude of variation.' 2 Their data "reveals that variation in awards is enormous. Within an individual severity level, the
highest valuation can be scores of times larger than the lowest."'3
They find, nonetheless, that "the current system works rationally and
fairly in an aggregate sense.""4 That is, "the fairness between separate categories of injury, is rather good. The main problem is the
absence of 'horizontal' equity-the extent of variation within a single
category."' 5 And, as might be expected, "[tihe distribution of awards
for non-economic loss shows even wider dispersion than the distribution for total awards ....
Thus, awards for pain and suffering and
other intangible losses may be unreasonably inconsistent within the
relatively discrete and unambiguous categories for injury severity."' 6

11. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 3, at 921 (table 2).
12. Id. at 921.
13. Id. at 923 (footnote omitted). The "injury severity level" they used for analysis of
the data is the nine-point scale "conventionally used for evaluating malpractice insurance
cases." Id. at 920. They found that it is the "best available single predictor of award
amount." Id. This scale was also used to analyze jury verdicts by Stephen Daniels & Joanne
Martin, Don't Kill the Messenger 'Till You Read the Message: Products Liability Verdicts in
Six California Counties, 1970-1990, 16 JUsT. Sys. J. 69, 95 (1993).
14. Bovbjerg, supra note 3, at 924.

15. Id.
16. Id. at 936-38.
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A similar conclusion was reached by Leebron on the basis of his
study of pain and suffering awards in 256 wrongful death cases.17
By limiting his study to death cases he was able to eliminate much
of the variation among fact patterns that might explain award variations. He concludes that "[a]s currently applied... the jury system,
coupled with deferential judicial review, produces an unacceptable
degree of variation in the awards."'" A more recent survey of
wrongful death awards supports Leebron's conclusion. Aaron J.
Broder reported on the non-pecuniary damage awards reported for
victims of the Korean Air Line disaster, finding that the ten awards
made by January, 1994, ranged from zero to $1.4 million. 9 Since all
of the decedents died in virtually the same circumstances, the variations can be only be explained by arguably irrelevant factors such as
the venue in which tried, the skill of the attorney, or (most probably)
the predilection of the trier of the fact in each case.
Variability is a problem primarily because it undermines the legal
system's claim that like cases will be treated alike; the promise of
equal justice under law is an important justification for our legal
system. Variability is also claimed to create instrumental defects; that
is, it makes it harder to settle cases, thus adding unnecessary transaction costs to the tort system, ° and delaying payment to needful
plaintiffs. Unpredictability also leads to inefficiencies because of overor under-precautions by affected industries and insurers'

17. Leebron, supra note 1, at 324-25.
18. Id. Using the "further rarification" of death by drowning cases, Leebron reports a
range of jury verdicts from zero to $137,000; even after appellate review, the range was from

$4,360 to $52,800. See id. at 297-98.
19. Aaron J. Broder, Judges, Juries and Verdict Awards, N.Y.

W., Jan. 3, 1994,

at 3, 3. All but one of the awards for non-pecuniary damages were jury verdicts. The one
award by a judge was $1 million.
20. There is some controversy whether uncertainty increases or decreases the likelihood

of settlement. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 3, at 926 n.92 (citing and discussing studies).
Pendell, speaking from an insurer's perspective, asserts that "there is little doubt that predictability greatly facilitates settlement by narrowing the gap between plaintiffs' and defendants'
judgments about their probability of success at trial and the likely size of the award." Judyth
W. Pendell, Enhancing Juror Effectiveness: An Insurer's Perspective, 52 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 311, 312 (1989).
21. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 3, at 925.
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B. Jurors' Resort to Inappropriate Criteria
Deprived of any standard but their "collective enlightened conscience,"' it would be surprising if jurors, consciously or not, did
not sometimes employ criteria of decision making that the formal
legal system regards as inappropriate. This can be a more serious
problem than that of juror whimsy, depending on the criterion applied.
There is disturbing evidence that some jurors have been affected
by the race of the litigants. In their study of verdicts in Cook County,
Illinois, Chin and Peterson report that "race seemed to have a pervasive influence on the outcomes of civil jury trials." After adjusting
for case types, injuries and the characteristics of other parties, black
plaintiffs and defendants lost more often than other parties.24 When
black plaintiffs did win, they recovered only seventy-four percent of
what other plaintiffs got for the same injury.' On the other hand,
awards against black defendants were ten percent less than against
other defendants.
Other investigators have found that the plaintiff's gender was
influential on awards.'s A study using mock jurors found a propensity to award greater economic damages to female plaintiffs suing for
damages due to male wrongful deaths than the reverse." Leebron's
data on pain and suffering awards in reported wrongful death cases
also indicated that the awards for male victims were less than those
for female victims.' At a minimum, further investigation of the impact of race and gender is warranted. The evidence we do have only
begins to suggest the dimensions of the problem; it also suggests that
we are right to worry about the degree our standardless system allows
bias to play a role.
The "deep pocket" effect has been another source of concern.
Chin and Peterson found that corporations and government agencies
were more likely to be found liable than individuals, and that higher

22. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
23. AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP PocKErs, EMPMY PoCKETs viii (1985).
24. Id.

25. Id. The authors do not report whether the latter figure was controlled for income
levels of the plaintiffs.
26. See supra notes 24-25.
27. Jane Goodman et al., Money, Sex, and Death: Gender Bias in Wrongful Death
Damage Awards, 25 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 263 (1991).
28. Leebron, supra note 1, at 306.
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damages were assessed against them 9 These findings were corroborated in another study using data gathered from twenty-seven states.3
This need not suggest an anti-institution bias or an exercise in wealth
re-distribution. It may be that jurors conclude that corporations have
more ability to act rationally than individuals, and so should be held
to a higher level of responsibility. But whatever the explanation, it
seems that some jurors are bringing an inappropriate element into the
damages deliberation.
Media coverage of jury verdicts and of the tort "crisis" may also
improperly affect actual jury behavior. One would expect that the
media report only exceptional cases. To test this proposition, we
surveyed the personal injury awards reported in two New York newspapers over a six year period and compared the verdicts reported to
the medians and averages of the actual verdicts during the same period. As predicted, the verdicts reported exceeded the median of actual
verdicts geometrically 1

29. CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 23, at v; see also Valerie P. Hans & William S.
Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implication for the Litigation
Explosion Debate, 26 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 85, 87 (1992) (collecting studies).
30. Brian Ostrom et al., What Are Tort Awards Really Like? The Untold Story from the
State Courts, LAW & POL'Y, Jan. 1992, at 77. "The central conclusion to emerge from our

model of verdicts in tort cases is that the size of the plaintiff's award is related most closely
to litigant status rather than the type of trial, the areas of tort law, the length of time to
disposition, or the locale." Id. at 93.

31. See infra Tables IA, 1B, 1I.
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TABLE IA 32

Year

NY Times Personal Injury Award Reports
(All awards in millions of dollars)
#
Hi
Low
Avg

Med

88

16

25.0

.75

7.6

7.0

89
90
91
92
93

16
13
17
19
14

200.0
15.1
30.7
127.0
163.9

.5
.15
.4
.225
1.0

20.5
7.7
12.8
15.9
25.3

5.5
7.6
2.8
4.3
10.1

TABLE lB

NY Newsday Personal Injury Award Reports

(All awards in millions of dollars)
Year
88

#
11

Hi
25.0

Low
.75

Avg
6.7

Med
4.75

89

14

61.6

90

15

76.1

.02

9.8

4.6

.12

11.5

91

22

6.1

127.0

.4

9.2

92
93

8
29

1.5

30.0
163.9

.5
1.0

6.2
23.4

2.4
5.4

32. Tables IA and 1B employ the following methodology. If an award was reported in
the same paper on more than one occasion, it was included in the data more than once if
the reports appeared at least one week apart. This procedure was justified for two reasons.
First, within one week, it is likely that a reader would recall an article was referring to an
award that had previously been reported, and not a new award. Secondly, higher awards
tended to receive attention in a newspaper over the subsequent few days following its announcement. To characterize every newspaper mention within the first week as a separate
report would overly emphasize extremely large awards.
Only cases in which a defendant was found liable are included; findings of no liability were not recorded. Two reports are included in which multiple plaintiffs shared one award;
the total award was recorded in the Table as one award on the premise that a reader would
recall the whole amount, not the average received by many plaintiffs. The two cases were an
award of $30,700,000 reported by the New York Times in 1991 and an award of $7,150,000
reported by Newsday in 1988. Asbestos Case Damages, N.Y. TIMS, Jan. 25, 1991, at D3;
Peter Bowles, Ex-Navy Yard Workers Win Suit, NEWSDAY, Dec. 16, 1988, at 31. If a jury
award was subsequently reduced by a trial judge or an appellate court, the lower figure reported at the later date was the only number recorded if the reduction was reported by the
same newspaper. If the adjustment was not reported in the same paper, the original jury
award was recorded. Lastly, only personal injury cases in which pain and suffering damages
could have been awarded were included in the study.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol23/iss4/1
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TABLE I
Personal Injury Verdicts - 1988 - 1992V3
(Amounts in actual dollars)

Year
Average
A. Statewide (New York State)
1988
$882,940
1989
$1,107,381
1990
$1,086,383
1991
$851,128
1992
$964,553
B. Metropolitan New York
1988
$967,432
1989
$1,138,104
1990
$1,121,312
1991
$954,996
1992
$1,034,039
C. All Other Counties (Upstate)
1988
$374,180
1989
$300,378
1990
$858,097
1991
$490,385
1992
$637,546

Median

Cases

$200,000
$200,000
$227,066
$190,000
$250,000

374
443
467
387
417

$248,212
$250,000
$263,897
$225,000

$274,000

306
335
332
253
294

$85,000
$139,338
$150,000
$124,530
$125,000

68
108
135
134
123

To the extent that future jurors base their decisions on their
knowledge (as gleaned from the media) of past awards, at least two
possible problems arise. Jurors may tend to over-compensate because
they have an unrealistic sense of the allowable range of recoveries."
Alternatively, jurors may under-compensate because of their dislike
for the "windfall" aspect of some very large awards.35
At least some players in the tort system apparently believe that

33. Note on statistical method: Only cases in which plaintiff recovered' are included, not
defense verdicts. Only personal injury cases are covered, not contract or property damage.
Only jury verdicts are included, not Court of Claims and other bench trials. Figures courtesy
of New York Jury Verdict Reporter.
34. Hans & Lofquist, supra note 29, at 86.
35. Id. at 111-12.
Jurors themselves are affected and influenced by other juries' decisions in a number of ways. The jurors we interviewed appeared to be quite cognizant of other

civil juries, real and apocryphal. Their concerns about deep pockets, the litigation
crisis, and the integrity of plaintiffs were implicitly and explicitly linked to the

presumed excesses of antecedent juries.
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mass media can affect verdicts.36 Institutions with major stakes in
the outcomes produced by the tort system have used advertising to attempt to influence aggregate jury verdicts by stating the case for
moderation."
In short, jurors bring some information about levels of compensation actually made in tort cases with them when they arrive at the
courthouse, but it is not very reliable information. It is wildly inflated.
C. Costs to the Justice System
Standardless pain and suffering verdicts may add to the cost of
tort litigation not only by the difficulties they add to the settlement
process, but also by protracting deliberation in the cases that are tried.
Juries may (this is conjectural) have difficulty agreeing on the right
range when there is no guidance, and their unwitting departure from
the limits that courts think are appropriate undoubtedly adds to the
frequency with which judges must review their verdicts.
Courts performing the reviewing function may at least resort to
reported decisions to determine what other courts and jurors have
done with like cases. While not all courts engage in such an examination, the practice is well-established in some jurisdictions." Yet
courts that are willing to undertake a comparative review are illnformed about the vast majority of cases because aggregate trends are
not available to them. The cost here is not only the inefficiencies of
each court undertaking its own search for relevant data on each review of an award, but the perhaps larger cost of the integrity of the
system. After all, it is hard to understand why judicially-arrived pain
and suffering awards are more principled than jury verdicts when the
process used to reach the decision is also handicapped by ignorance,
even if not to the same degree.39

36. See Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil
Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, 52 LAW & CONmP. PROBS. 269,
281-92 (1989) (discussing examples).
37. Id. (discussing such examples).
38. See Baldus, supra note 3.
39. The problem of incoherent judicial review of jury verdicts is addressed in depth by
Baldus, supra note 3. See also Schnapper, supra note 3.
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III. PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The ABA Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability
System" made three recommendations directed to pain and suffering
damages. One, there should be greater use of additur and remittitur
by trial and appellate courts to set aside verdicts that are "clearly
disproportionate to community expectations," but there should not be
ceilings on pain and suffering damages.4 1 Two, there should be one
or more "tort award commissions" established to gather and report information that would be useful in "the framing of jury instructions,
the exercise of the power of additur and remittitur, and the process of
settling cases."'42 Three, "[o]ptions should be explored to provide
more guidance to the jury on the appropriate range of damages to be
awarded for pain and suffering in a particular case."'43 No specific
method of providing juries with the desired guidance was endorsed,
but the Comment states that some members would have the trial
judge suggest "a non-binding range of high and low awards."" The
Comment also notes that the data gathered by the proposed tort award
commission could be useful in developing the guidelines.4' As will
become apparent, my own proposal attempts to put flesh on the bones
of the Commission's recommendation.
The ALI Reporters' Study, Enterprise Liability for Personal Injury,' also recommends against mandatory ceilings for pain and suffering damages.47 It instead suggests adoption of a floor or threshold
of serious injury that would have to be met before pain and suffering
damages could be obtained.' The Study found that minor injuries
tend to be overcompensated, so a floor would eliminate this problem
while freeing money for more serious injury victims.49 The Study
also recommends the development of "[m]eaningful guidelines" to aid
juries in assessing pain and suffering damages."0 "The guidelines

40. See ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-15.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 13 (RecommendatiorL No. 2).
Id. at 14-15 (Recommendation No. 3).
Id. at 15 (Recommendation No. 4).
Id.
Id.

46. ALI REPORT, supra note 3.

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

218-20.
230 (Recommendation 2); see id. at 218-21.
220-21.
230 (Recommendation 3), 221-27.
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should be based on a scale of inflation-adjusted damage amounts
attached to a number of disability profiles that range in severity from
the relatively moderate to the gravest injuries."' The discussion of
the guidelines indicates that the authors of the study held somewhat
differing views about the degree to which the guidelines should be
binding on the jury. 2 The proposal presented below adopts a nonbinding approach.
Baldus, MacQueen, and Woodworth focus less on guiding the
jury than on rationalizing judicial review of jury verdicts.53 They
recommend a method of using prior approved awards, inflation and
other variables to construct a systematic method of review.54
Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein have proposed four specific methods
of controlling jury unpredictability.' One suggestion is the creation
of an award matrix, whereby each plaintiff's injury would be classified by severity level and plaintiff's age.56 Each resulting "cell" of
the matrix would be keyed to a value for pain and suffering which
would be obtained by averaging previous awards for such injuries?'
Juries would be free to determine the cell into which each case fell,
but would have to award the exact amount indicated." A second
proposal is the use of standardized injury scenarios with associated
dollar values.5 9 The jury would be provided with a few relevant scenarios, instructed to determine which most approximates the plaintiff's
situation and to base their pain and suffering award on it." Their
third alternative is "a set of varying floors and ceilings bounding jury
awards at both the high and low ends of valuation."'" The categories
would be constructed from prior award averages, using age and severity levels.62 In a separate article, the same authors present a fourth
alternative in which aggregations of previous awards would also be
provided to the jury.63 Jurors would have to explain awards that fell

51. Id. at 320.
52. Id. at 221-29.
53. See generally Baldus et al, supra note 3.

54. Id.
55. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 3.
56. Id. at 939-53.

57. Id. at 945.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 953-56.
60. Id. at 950.

61. Id. at 959; see id. at 959-60.
62. Id.
63. Blumstein et al., supra note 3, at 172.
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in the highest or lowest quartile of the range. 6" Unexplained outliers
would be presumed to be improper by reviewing courts.s
Common to the four proposals by Bovbjerg, Sloan, and
Blumstein is the development of a data bank of prior awards in the
jurisdiction.'
IV. AN INFORMATION-ORIENTED PROPOSAL

The described proposals differ primarily in the degree of flexibility they preserve for the jury. That presented below is more oriented
toward preserving jury autonomy than most of the others. It assumes
that by providing jurors with more information about prior awards
their verdicts will be more rational and will be seen to be so. Thus,
less control of jurors will be required. Some might see this as a first
reform-to be followed by more drastic measures if dissatisfaction
persists. This proposal takes seriously the invitation of the ABA Commission to explore methods for providing more guidance to jurors.
I propose that jurors in all personal injury actions in which nonpecuniary damages are sought be informed of the range of awards
made by other juries in the same state for such damages during a
contemporaneous time period.' The information would be provided
in a chart constructed to allow comparison with roughly similar cases
in which plaintiffs' verdicts were recovered.' The chart would be
described by the court in its charge to the jury, and counsel would be
free to comment on it during summation. It would be available to the
jury during deliberation, along with appropriate instructions on its
purpose and related special verdicts. The jurors would not be bound
by the information they receive, but would presumably use it to form
a general impression of a "reasonable" award.
More specifically, the chart would grid the median, high, and
low sums awarded (after any judicial reduction or reversal) for each
of the severity levels on the widely-accepted nine-point injury severity

64. lId at 179.
65. Id
66. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 3, at 960.
67. Of course, the idea of providing information to jurors about previous awards has
been suggested by others as well. See, e.g., ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 15;
2 ALI REPORT, supra note 3, at 230; Leebron, supra note 1, at 322-23. I am grateful to
John Evancho and Judyth W. Pendell for directing my attention to this literature and to the
concept of the grid or chart as an aid to jurors.
68. The authority responsible for constructing the actual chart and the process to be
used are discussed infra notes 69-78.
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scale69 for persons in the plaintiff's age bracket. The jury would be
instructed to determine the injury severity level of the most significant injury suffered by the plaintiff due to the culpability of the defendant and to report this as a separate itemized verdict.7 It would
then be asked to determine the award for pain and suffering as a
separate item of damages.
A sample chart with model instructions (but without dollar
amounts) is presented in Figure 1. Numbers are not included because
the damage awards by severity category have not yet been calculated.

69. The scale replicates the nine-point severity of injury scale. See supra note 13.
70. This would aid a reviewing court in determining the jury's reasons for reaching the
pain and suffering award and facilitate future statistical evaluation.
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FIGURE 1
Prior Pain and Suffering Awards in New York State
for Persons in the Age Bracket N - N
During Years 1989 - 1994, Keyed to Level of
Severity of Their Most Significant Injury
Injury Severity
Level
I. Emotional only; fright,
no physical damage
2. Temporary insignificant;
lacerations, contusions,
minor scars
3. Temporary minor, infection,
fracture
4. Temporary major, bums,
brain damage, surgical
material left in patient
5. Permanent minor, loss of
fingers, loss or damage
to organs, non-disabling
injuries
6. Permanent significant;
deafness, loss of limb,
loss of eye, loss of one
kidney or lung
7. Permanent major, paraplegia,
blindness, loss of two
limbs, brain damage
8. Permanent grave; quadriplegia,
severe brain damage,
or fatal prognosis
lifelong care
71
9. [Death]

Median
Award

Highest
Award

Lowest
Award

Instruction to jurors: The conditions following each severity category in the chart are merely examples. They are intended to help you
determine the severity level of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff.
The awards reported on the chart will inform you of the range of

71. It would be better not to provide the awards in wrongful death cases to jurors
considering non-death cases, as the considerations are very different and the figures could
lead to confusion.
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awards made for pain and suffering in other New York State cases
for the indicated level of severity of injury during the past five
years. All figures reflect only awards reached after a trial and any
appeal. The median number is the mid-point of all reported cases.
In other words, in half of the cases the award was higher than the
median and in half it was lower.
As explained in the judge's charge to you, you are not bound
by the range of awards reported here. These awards are provided to
help you, the representatives of the community, as you determine
the right amount of money that should be awarded to the plaintiff
to compensate [him/her] for pain and suffering. If you believe that
some aspect of the plaintiff's injuries or suffering justifies a higher
or lower award than was previously made for other plaintiffs who
suffered the same severity level of injury, you may award that
greater or lesser amount. After you determine the severity level, fill
in the answers to following special verdicts:
1. We find that the most significant injury suffered by the plaintiff
falls into severity level

_.

2. We find that the plaintiff's award for pain and suffering is

$....

A rough idea of what the figures might look like for one injury
level can be constructed using Leebron's data base for wrongful death
cases.' He provides data for all wrongful death cases found using
the West Reporter System and "other means." I have constructed
the grid in Figure 2 from all New York cases (thirteen) reported by
Leebron in which an award for pain and suffering was made and
survived judicial review. Because his data did not capture ages, I
report all cases without regard to the victim's age.

72. Leebron, supra note 1, at 291.
73. Id. at 291 n.139. The 256 cases are listed in Leebron's appendix. Id. at 326-42
(Appendix A). Only officially reported cases are included.
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FIGURE 2
Previous Pain and Suffering Awards in New York State
During Years 1980 - 1987, Keyed to Level of
Severity of Their Most Significant Injury

Highest Lowest
Median
Injury Severity
Award
Award
Award
Level
1
- 8 levels
at
severity
award
information
be
given
would
[Jurors
in each case that did not involve death. In death cases they would get
only the award information for death cases.]74

9. Death

$70,000

$200,000

$50

If this proposal is adopted, determinations are likely to be more
consistent with those in which similar facts were at issue. One can
never be sure of the use jurors will make of a chart such as those
presented in Figures 1 and 2, but it is reasonable to expect that they
will try to develop a collective sense of the relative nature of the
decedent's suffering by considering its length, intensity, and the
person's level of consciousness, all of which will no doubt have been
brought out at trial and referenced in summation. Jurors moved by
what they conclude was extreme suffering by the plaintiff will probably return a verdict at or even above the highest award on the chart,
but they are unlikely to return a verdict that is multiples higher or
lower.
Because the jurors will be able to engage in a more informed
deliberative process, they will be somewhat constrained against reliance on factors that the formal legal system regards as extraneous,
such as the race and gender of the plaintiff, the deep pocket of the
defendant or the context in which the injury occurred (auto accident
versus medical malpractice). Jurors will be less inclined to rely on an
impressionistic sense of what the right level of damages should be as
garnered from casual reading of newspaper articles or insurance company advertising campaigns. I expect that jurors making damage determinations under the proposed system will also develop more re-

74. The reason for this is that in all categories other than death, the jurors' fact finding
duties include choice of a severity-level; no such issue arises in death cases. In death cases it
would be needlessly confusing for the jurors to be given award reports for other severity
levels. In non-death cases, the awards given in death cases are irrelevant. I am grateful to
Mark Geistfeld for his contribution on this point.
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spect for the litigation process because of the more informed way in
which they participate in it.
Since everyone involved in the personal injury litigation will also
have access to improved information, the parties will be able to make
a better informed assessment of the value of the case. Whether or not
this leads to an increase in settlements, it could lead to more rational
decision-making about whether to settle.
Courts confronted with attacks on verdicts, whether on appeal or
post-trial, should have more confidence in the jury result because it
will have been based on better information. Even a verdict that departs from the norm awarded for such injuries should be entitled to
greater weight than at present because, in the absence of an indication
of extraneous factors, the higher verdict presumably reflects the
jurors' collective sense that there was something anomalous about this
case. Alternatively, a court would seem to have absolutely no reason
to tamper with an award that fell within the high-low range. Thus,
my proposal would strengthen our commitment to the ideal of the
jury as the finder of facts. Courts that conclude that for some reason
additur or remittitur is indicated, will have a better sense of the degree of change justifiable in the light of the full range of experience
in the jurisdiction, rather than the few (perhaps atypical) cases that
were reviewed by that particular appellate court.
The publication of the tables on which the proposed grid would
be constructed would likely be useful to insurers in rate-making and
to policy makers in evaluating the health of the personal injury compensation system.75
The proposal presented here could be adopted in any jurisdiction
that has or will develop the necessary database. Like others who have
addressed the problem,76 I conclude that development of better data
is a key ingredient in bringing more predictability to the system. I
urge this proposal to the special attention of New York policy makers. New York already has much of a suitable database available
through the efforts of the New York Jury Verdict Reporter.' This

75. The value of improved information about jury verdicts has been recognized by several other commentators. See supra text accompanying notes 33-49.
76. See, e.g., Blumstein et a., supra note 3.
77. This reporter, published monthly, collects and reports approximately 90% of all jury
verdicts in personal injury cases tried to verdict in the metropolitan New York area and 75%
of all such verdicts in the remaining counties of the state. The results of post-verdict motions
are also reported, but, so far as I am aware, appellate reversals of previously reported ver-

dicts are not. Documented submissions by attorneys for the litigants are used as the prime
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data base can include non-pecuniary damages as a separate item of

recovery because New York now requires itemized verdicts in all
must make a separate finding of the
personal injury actions; jurors
78
"pain and suffering" award.

New York is also suitable because its

courts, like those of other jurisdictions, have recognized the value of
prior verdicts and judicial decisions as guides for courts deciding

whether to set aside or affirm july damage verdicts.7 9 It is hard to
see why courts, but not jurors, construing the reasonableness of an

award should have access to information about prior awards in similar
cases.
In some respects, the proposed grid has strengths and weaknesses
that are analogous to a jury aid used in New York and elsewhere-the standard mortality tables. Based on aggregate data that

changes over time and that is not a valid predictor for discrete subsamples or for any individuals, these tables are nonetheless often
admitted into evidence or even the subject of judicial notice. 0 Cau-

source for the awards reported. Interview with Russell F. Moran, Editor, New York Jury
Verdict Reporter (Aug. 3, 1993).
Appellate decisions affecting awards would have to be added to the database to make
it usable under my proposal. Further, the injuries described for each case by the New York
Jury Verdict Reporter would have to be coded to the nine-point severity scale proposed for
my grid. Expansion of the reported cases to 100% would be desirable but, in my view, is
not a precondition to the utility of the data because of the large size of the reported sample
and the apparent random nature of the cases reported.
78. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4111(f) (McKinney 1994); see also N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L.
& R. 4213(b) (McKinney 1994) (imposing the same obligation on the judge when an action
has been tried without a jury).
79. See Senko v. Fonda, 384 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851-52 (App. Div. 1976); see also Martell
v. Boardwalk Enters., Inc., 748 F.2d 740, 750 (2d Cir. 1984); Wendell v. Supermarkets Gen.
Corp., 592 N.Y.S.2d 895, 897 (App. Div. 1993) (reviewing award of pain and suffering damages, the court affirms in part, citing five other cases, all of which, like the case under review, involved back injuries likely to be permanent); infra text accompanying notes 90-106.
80. See, for example, New York's Pattern Jury Instructions:
If you find that any of plaintiff's injuries are permanent, you must make
such allowances in you verdict as you think that circumstance warrants, taking into
consideration the period of time that has elapsed from the date of the injury to the
present time and the period of time plaintiff can be expected to live. In this connection it is pointed out to you that plaintiff can be expected to live
for . . . more years, that is, until age . . . , according to the most recent life
expectancy tables published by the United States government
632 (2d ed. 1974 & Supp. 1995) (alter1 NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CV
ation in original).
In Vicksburg & Meridian Railroad Co. v. Putnam, the United States Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for pain and suffering and loss of future income, and that life and annuity tables are competent evidence to assist the jury in making
such an estimate. 118 U.S. 545, 554-55 (1866) (citing Phillips v. London & S.W. Ry., 4

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1995], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:763

tionary instructions are deemed sufficient to prevent the jury from

over-reliance on them.'
Finally, current New York practice makes its courts peculiarly
susceptible to erratic verdicts. For example, a six-person jury is prescribed in civil cases and only five-sixths need agree to return a
verdict.' Adoption in New York would allow that state to serve as

Q.B.D. 406, 5 Q.B.D. 78 (1879) and Rowley v. London & N.W. Ry., 8 L.R.-Ex. 221
(1873)).
In Phillips, the English courts stated that while there was no precise rule as to the
measure of damages, the jury must take a reasonable view of all facts and circumstances
when awarding damages, and part of their consideration should be the life expectancy of the
plaintiff. Phillips, 4 Q.B.D. at 407. Rowley involved an action under Lord Campbell's Act
(English wrongful death statute), where the trial judge admitted the testimony of an accountant who gave an estimate of the probable duration of the life of the deceased, based upon
the mortality rates collected in the Carlisle Tables. The Court of Exchequer held that the
admission of such evidence was appropriate in a wrongful death action. The award of damages in a wrongful death action depends upon the ability of the jury to ascertain the probable
duration of life at a given age, therefore it is material to know what the average duration of
life is at that age. Rowley, 8 L.R.-Ex. at 226. There is no better means of showing probable
duration of life than "by proving the practice of life insurance companies, who learn it by
experience." Id.
In People v. Security Life Insurance & Annuity Co., the New York Court of Appeals
held that mortality tables are built on the long and varied experience of the insurance business, and are therefore deemed sufficiently reliable in the absence of a better basis to guide
the courts in making calculations based upon the average life span of an individual. 78 N.Y.
114 (1879). New York courts may take judicial notice of mortality tables with the qualification that the tables are based on an average life span, and therefore the jury must also account for the plaintiff's health, constitution, habits, and manner of living. See, e.g., McKenna
v. McGoldrick, 27 N.Y.S.2d 58 (App. Div. 1941); Giambrone v. Israel Am. Line, Inc., 208
N.Y.S.2d 215, (Sup. Ct. 1960).
81. The l1th Circuit utilizes the following instruction:
4.1
MORTALITY TABLES-ACTUARIAL EVIDENCE
(Life Expectancy In General)
If a preponderance of the evidence shows that the Plaintiff has been permanently injured, you may consider his life expectancy. The mortality tables received
in evidence may be considered in determining how long the claimant may be
expected to live. Bear in mind, however, that life expectancy as shown by mortality tables is merely an estimate of the average remaining life of all persons in the
United States of a given age and sex having average health and ordinary exposure
to danger of persons in that group. So, such tables are not binding on you but
may be considered together with the other evidence in the case bearing on the
Plaintiff's own health, age, occupation and physical condition, before and after the
injury, in determining the probable length of his life.
COMMITTEE ON PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DiSmR= JuIXEs Assoc., ELEVENTh CIRcuIT,
PATrERN JURY INSTRUCnoNs: CIVIL CASES 177 (1990).
82. There is evidence that six-person juries produce greater variation in awards than
twelve-person juries. Leebron, supra note 1, at 315 (citing Hans Zeisel, . . . And Then There
Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. Ci. L. REV. 710, 716-17 (1971)).
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a "little laboratory" in which the approach could be evaluated.
Any proposal involves policy choices. Here I surface and comment on some that I have made differently from others in the literature on this general problem. As discussed earlier, I recommend the
retention of non-pecuniary damages, and I reject flat caps. 3 Beyond
that, ihe key decisional points in this proposal are:
A. Preservation of Jury Control Over the Award for
Non-Pecuniary Damages
My proposal involves no new direct restrictions on powers currently enjoyed by the jury. The jurors would simply be better informed than they are now. I am unpersuaded that the virtues of a
fixed schedule of non-pecuniary damages would be a wiser course.
Proponents of such an approach have not satisfactorily resolved the
problems of individual, temporal, and jurisdictional variables. For
example, the ALI study, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury84 found attractive some features of mandatory schedules but ultimately concluded that "idiosyncratic cases" would best be resolved by
juries, and that juries should have the authority to exceed even the
top award on the scale.85 Moreover, even if indexed for inflation'
binding schedules do not allow jurors, as an aggregate, to reflect a
sea-change in community thinking about compensation for personal
injury.86 We know from experience that such changes do take place,
and the jury system seems a good way to allow their expression.
Even under my proposal, the possibility of an indirect impact on
jury awards is raised because, inasmuch as the trial and appellate
courts would also be better informed of prior awards in the jurisdiction by virtue of the availability of the grid, they might be tempted to
overturn verdicts that depart even slightly from past patterns. This is
not a necessary outcome. Departures from the norms represented by
the grid may well (and appropriately) attract attention from the court,
but the review should take into account the legitimate factors, if any,
that moved the jury to its verdict and will allow them to stand if
justified.

This problem is likely to be exacerbated when only five jurors need agree on the verdict.
Zeisel, supra, at 716.

83. See supra pp. 765, 775-76.
84. 2 ALI REPORT, supra note 3.
85. Id. at 226-27.
86. Id. at 221-27.
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B. The Use of a Relatively Simplified Grid
I do not recommend fine-tuning of injury types along the lines
suggested by Baldus, MacQueen, and Woodworth for their reformed
additur/remittitur process. They claim that
[tio identify personal injury cases that are similar, it is necessary
ideally to identify cases in which the location and type of injury are
the same, i.e, it cannot be said that when a certain type of injury
occurs to the arm that it is similar to that type of injury when it
occurs in the legs ... e.g., different symptoms occur, different
treatments are required, different functional outcomes may occur-all factors that may bear on the level of the plaintiff's pain,
suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. 7
No doubt. It is also true, however, that an injury to my leg is not the
same as an injury to that of the hypothetical chess hobbyist.88 And it
is the case that not all leg injuries (or even amputations) are the same
in the respects mentioned by Baldus, MacQueen, and Woodworth.
The more one strives for close comparability, the more factors one
must introduce ifi the grid. Reductio ad absurdum takes us back to
the present regime of totally individualized jury awards and impressionistic judicial controls: No two plaintiffs are ever the same. The
hard question, once one departs from the present approach, is to
determine the right level of categorization.
In part the answer depends on the decisional body that must deal
with the distinctions. The Baldus, MacQueen, and Woodworth approach has more to commend it when it is recommended for use by
the judiciary in an enhanced additur/remittitur review than for jurors.
By aptitude and training, judges are better able to assimilate and use
a complex set of facts. I fear that the more complex the aids presented to a jury, the more likely it will confuse rather than clarify. As
the list of factors to consider grows, the temptation to ignore them
grows.
The use of the categories also bears on the level of detail desirable. In a system of binding schedules it is more appropriate to finetune the categories, whereas with a discretionary approach like that

87. Baldus et al., supra note 3.
88. I am an avid, if geriatric, softball player. The ALI Reporter's Study makes the same
point by comparing the chess player with an amateur pianist. See 2 ALI REPORT, supra note

3, at 225.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol23/iss4/1

24

Chase: Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards
1995]

HELPING JURORS

presented here, more inclusive categories can be tolerated. The assumption is that, given the freedom to do so, jurors will take the
relevant differences into account even if they are not scheduled.
Increasing the complexity of any scale proposal, whether binding
or not, would seem to increase transaction costs at two points. A
decisional body engaged in constructing the system to be adopted will
necessarily find its task made more onerous as the lines needed to
draw the complete picture are multiplied. The jurors who employ the
system may also find it more difficult to agree on a series of minidecisions than to pick an appropriate amount from within a general
range.
The simplified grid implicitly rejects the use of injury "scenarithe brief examples that are included in the injury severity
beyond
os"
scale. Detailed scenarios keyed to recommended (or required) awards
would be difficult to construct because of the myriad of differences in
real-world fact patterns. Assignment of values would also be very
controversial-it would defy principled solution. The start-up costs
would be compounded by the difficulties jurors would likely encounter in digesting and applying the scenarios to the case at hand.
My suggested use of age and severity of injury as the only factors in the grid has empirical support. Bovbjerg and his colleagues
report:
We investigated the influence of [various] factors empirically
for their influence on past patterns of awards for non-economic
loss .... This analysis shows that the severity of injury is the
strongest correlate of amount, with the age of the victim next. Body
part alone is not as predictive of non-economic damages as injury
severity. Moreover, it is not possible to use body part in the same
regression as severity because it is too closely correlated with the
nine-point severity scale."
Their last point is especially telling, given my proposed use of the
nine-point scale. The addition of body part to the matrix would be a
kind of double counting.
To be sure, the collapse of all injuries, including death, into nine
categories, introduces a wide range within each category. Some courts
that engage in the review of jury verdicts by making comparisons
with other verdicts have restricted the comparison to similar type as
well as similar degree of injury. For example, in Wendell v. Super-

89. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 3, at 941.
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markets General Corp.," the plaintiff was a fifty-four year old woman who sustained two herniated discs, impingement of the spinal cord,
and compression of the nerve to the shoulder and the arm.9 She
was awarded $15,000 for past pain and suffering and $15,000 for
future pain and suffering.' The trial court ordered a new trial unless
the defendant stipulated to $75,000 for past pain and suffering and
$100,000 for future pain and suffering.' On appeal, the Appellate
Division held that the amount of damages for future pain and suffering deviated from what would be considered reasonable compensation
in "similar circumstances." 4 The court cited five cases: Reed v.
Harter Chair Corp.,95 Diorio v. Scala," Lamot v. Gondek,
Bottone v. New York Telephone Co.,9" and Hughes v. Peters.' Each
of the cited cases involved a severe back injury, as did Wendell. That
is the only similarity, however, as the plaintiffs vary by sex, age, and
the manner in which the injury occurred. Awards for pain and suffering in those cases ranged (after review) from $16,500 to $330,000.
The Wendell court apparently felt comfortable with a figure somewhere in between, albeit on the low end."
The Wendell injury falls into category five on the nine-point
scale, "permanent minor" injury.' But so too does the injury at issue in Leon v. J&M Peppe Realty Corp., °2 The plaintiff in this case
was a twenty-six year old man who suffered partial amputation of the
three middle fingers of his left hand (non-dominant hand) and a fifty
to sixty percent disability. 3 He was initially awarded $1,600,000
for past and future pain and suffering, but the trial court ordered the
verdict set aside unless the plaintiff stipulated to a reduction for future pain and suffering from $1,500,000 to $750,000, although the
award of $100,000 for past pain and suffering was allowed to

90. 592 N.Y.S. 2d 895 (App. Div. 1993).
91. Id. at 896.

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 897.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

586 N.Y.S.2d 401 (App. Div. 1992).
583 N.Y.S.2d 654 (App. Div. 1992).
558 N.Y.S.2d 284 (App. Div. 1990).
487 N.Y.S.2d 170, leave for appeal denied, 484 N.E.2d 1053 (N.Y. 1985).
563 N.Y.S.2d 269 (App. Div. 1990).
Wendell, 592 N.Y.S.2d. at 897.
See supra Figure 1 accompanying note 71.
596 N.Y.S.2d 380 (App. Div. 1993).
Id. at 382.
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stand.'" The Appellate Division ruled on appeal that the awards, as
reduced, were not out of line with recent awards sustained by the
appellate courts, and cited to Dauria v. City of New York"0 5 and
Stiles v. Batavia Atomic Horseshoes, Inc.,e 6 cases that both involved
amputations."c In Dauria, the loss of two toes was held to justify
an award of $1,800,000 in pain and suffering damages."' 8 In Stiles,
the loss of three fingers of the right hand plus permanent deformity
of the left was at issue; the court affirmed as not excessive a total verdict (general plus non-pecuniary damages) of $1,705,000."0
All of the plaintiffs are within the same age group, but there is no
indication whether this is a deliberate choice by the court or whether
this occurred purely by chance. Thus, the Stiles court was comfortable
comparing a partial hand amputation to one plaintiff who had serious
injuries to both hands and to another plaintiff who had a toe amputation.
Under the nine-point grid the grouping would be even broader.
Both the Stiles-type injury (amputation) and the Wendell-type (permanent back pain) would apparently fall into the same category, with a
resultant spread of awards from $16,500 to $1.8 million. A legitimate
criticism is that this range provides very little guidance. On the other
hand, the median (approximately $300,000) would be useful as a
starting point, and the jury could use the verbal description of the
category to decide whether the case to be decided fit in the high or
low end."'
Another issue concerns the use of state-wide figures as opposed
to smaller geographic units. Intra-state geographical differences in
award patterns are probably nowhere as pronounced as in New
York."' These aggregate differentiations probably survive even ap-

104. Id. at 383.
105. 577 N.Y.S.2d 64 (App. Div), leave for appeal denied, 599 N.E.2d 691 (N.Y. 1991).
106. 579 N.Y.S.2d 790 (App. Div. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 597 N.Y.S.2d 666

(N.Y. 1993).
107. Leon, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
108. Dauria, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
109. Stiles, 579 N.Y.S.2d 792.
110. Id. at 794.
111. Category 5 reads: "Permanent minor, loss of fingers, loss or damage to organs, nondisabling injuries." See supra Figure 1 accompanying note 71.
112. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Jwy Verdicts and the "Crisis" in Civil Justice,
11 JusT. Sys. J. 321 (1986) (reporting a significant difference between metropolitan New
York and the rest of the state); see also supra Table II. No personal injury practitioner familiar with the state would be surprised.
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pellate review. It is very unusual for any of the four appellate courts
(or departments) that make up the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court to look to cases from another department in any area of law,
and the jurisdiction of the departments is geographically based. To
lump awards for the entire state on the grid, regardless of the venue
of the action to be decided, as I propose, is arguably unfair, especially if, as some claim, geographic variations reflect differences in the
wealth of the respective communities."' On the other hand, variations can also be seen as one aspect of the irrationality of the current
system. In a mobile society in which the prices of major goods are
determined nationally, why should the wealth of a locality determine
the rate at which pain is compensated? Are not regional variations
sufficiently accounted for in awards for lost income and future medical expenses? My proposal offers a workable compromise: A statewide grid gives the jurors in each locale a more cosmopolitan awareness, but since they remain free to find the right number on (or off)
the grid, we leave room for strong local tendencies to re-assert themselves.
V.

CONCLUSION

The proposed grid can become law in one of three ways. A rulemaking body, such as the Judicial Conference, or in New York, the
Chief Administrator of the Courts, could promulgate a grid and revise
it annually. Enabling legislation is, therefore, not necessary, but is
also a possibility.
Alternatively, a grid could be developed by counsel, placed into
evidence through expert testimony and then included in the charge. It
was this process that eventually led to the general acceptance of the
mortality tables."' It would present the problem of potentially competing grids and battles between experts over which is more accurate.
Legislative or administrative adoption, (after full opportunity for the
interested public to comment) is therefore far preferable.
However adopted, the proposed grid or some variant would help
to rationalize the process by which pain and suffering damages are
awarded and would do so without substantive impact and with modest
procedural cost.

113. See Baldus et al., supra note 3.
114. See supra note 80.'
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